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Abstract—Access control has been applied in various scenarios
in the past for negotiating the best policy. Solutions with XACML
for access control has been very well explored by research
and have resulted in significant contributions to various sectors
including healthcare. In controlling access to the sensitive data
such as medical records, it is important to guarantee that
the data is accessed by the right person for the right reason.
Location of access requestor can be a good indication for his/her
eligibility and reasons for accessing the data. To reason with
geospatial information for access control, Geospatial XACML
(eXtensible Access Control Markup Language) is proposed as
a standard. However, there is no available implementation and
architecture for reasoning with Geospatial XACML policies. This
paper proposes to extend XACML with geohashing to implement
geospatial policies. It also proposes an architecture for checking
reliability of the geospatial information provided by clients. With
a case study, we demonstrate how our framework can be used
to control the privacy and data access of health service data in
handheld devices.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices have been used in the modern world to
access information, exchange information and to store infor-
mation. With new applications and new solutions coming to
existence every day , handheld devices are being used more
and more to completely take over the functionality of a wallet,
laptop, computer, briefcase and books. With the increasing
demand on the mobile devices usage, the number of threats and
issues related to security with regards to the handheld devices
are doubled. Information exchange is a key requirement for
every sector and handheld devices are being used for the
very same purpose more frequently than ever before. How
can one ensure that the data being accessed is being accessed
by the right user of the data. How can one ensure that the data
requestor is the genuine requestor of the data and has the right
to access the data being requested.
This is a very interesting problem which highlights the
very existence of access control mechanisms. The process of
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making sure that data is accessed by the right source for
the right requirement is called access control. Making use
of access control in order to ensure that the right user is
getting hold of the right data has always been a concern in
all major areas of business including healthcare. Healthcare
data involves a lot of personal data of the end users and hence
it is critical to ensure that the data is not misused and is not
mishandled. It is equally important to ensure that data is being
accessed by the right user and does not fall into the hands of
a malicious user who would mishandle the data.
Researchers in the past have introduced solutions around
access control for healthcare with XACML. By making use
of XACML policy, and through policy negotiation, relevant
data is provided to the requestor based on the information
provided in the XACML policy. The solution has taken care
of the access control of the data but something very important
has been forgotten in this solution. The data can be requested
from anywhere and there is no way to stop an outsider from re-
questing the data. This introduces the importance of contextual
information for the requestor of the data. This paper specifi-
cally considers the location information of the data requestor
before granting access to the data. This has been achieved
by making use of geospatial attributes of the handheld device
from where the request is made. Once the geographical co-
ordinates are verified, the policy is then applied on the request
and then access to the data is eventually granted. This solution
has been implemented by using GeoXACML policy. This is
the first of a kind implementation of GeoXACML for access
control in mobile healthcare.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section I pro-
vides a brief introduction to access control and GeoXACML.
Section II covers the related work. Section III covers the
background about XACML, GeoXACML and the importance
of global attestation. Section IV covers the system model
for global attestation. Section V describes the Global attes-
tation scheme. Section VI describes the implementation of
GeoXACML. Section VII describes the implementation of the
Geospatial access control for mobile healthcare in an iphone
application. Section VIII shows the experiments and results of
the global attestation scheme. Finally, Section IX concludes
the paper.
2II. RELATED WORK
Jansen et al. [12], [13] describe an implementation of as-
signing and enforcing policies on handheld devices using Java
smartcards. The organization policy is distributed via tamper-
proof smartcards. All the devices are smartcard enabled. The
policy to be enforced is read from the smartcard, which
requires authentication by a username and pin. After authenti-
cation a card monitor continuously monitors the existence of
the smartcard. If the smartcard is removed the device reverts to
the default policy of the device. [13], [14] describe the use of a
policy specification language, a policy distribution mechanism
and certificate representation.
An XACML-based architecture is proposed [21] to tackle
the problems of compromise to the requesters data confiden-
tiality and integrity, and the issue of applicability of reputation
data. The traditional XACML polices, used for user access
control in distributed environments, can be used for mobile
agents access control [10]. Such policies are used to manage
delegation of access rights from users to agents while at
the same time following the core principles of the XACML
standard. [10] proposes a combination of policies that map
users to their mobile agents and make access control decisions
for mobile agents by evaluating complex policy sets. [4] deals
with the use of P3P policy by extending it for data access
control and use of XACML policy [5] in the mobile device
for data access control.
GeoXACML [1] is a geo-specific extension to XACML 2.0
and it is standardised by Open GeoSpatial Consortium ( OGC).
GeoXACML supports the declaration and enforcement of geo-
specific access rights. It also makes sure that it controls access
to services, data and other information in a service oriented
type architecture. GeoXACML [2] has been standardised but
there has not been any open standard implementation of this
to control the access rights to resources. We have implemented
the required parts of GeoXACML to fit our needs and imple-
mented a proof of concept version for some of the functions
and attributes.
Saroiu et al. [19] have described location proofs as a new
mechanism that enables the existence of mobile applications
that needs proof of the user’s location. It is handled by
the wireless access point to mobile devices. The solution
is mainly based on users and wireless access points (APs)
exchanging their signed public keys to create time-stamped
location proofs.The paper describes an implementation of the
location proofs. The paper shows six potential applications
that would be used by an infrastructure that provides location
proofs. It also showcases a protocol that is demonstrable over
WiFi and characterizes security properties of the design. The
paper details the difficulties that come from a collusion attacks
such as when sharing devices with one another. VeriPlace [16]
is a location proof architecture that takes care of the challenges
involving user trying to fool the systems by receiving location
proofs for locations where they are not located. These solutions
take care of the user’s privacy and is capable of detecting
cheating. VeriPlace used cryptographic techniques in order
to achieve system security. VeriPlace needs three types of
trusted entities that are run by different parties to avoid
collusion. To protect users privacy, each trusted entity is aware
if either a users identity or the location, but not both of them.
VeriPlace uses Cheating Detection Authority ( CDA) to check
if any cheating has occured. Using the encrypted access point
information, the CDA decrypts it and checks whether any two
APs are far from each other, if yes it indicates cheat.
Zhu et al [22] proposes a Privacy-Preserving Location proof
Updating System (APPLAUS) in which co-located mobile
devices which are bluetooth enabled generate location proofs
and then transfers the changes to a location proof server. In
order to protect source location privacy pseudonyms which
are changed periodically are used. The solution also shows
a model in which the users can assess their location privacy
levels and when and whether to receive the location proof
requests. The paper also shows a way to secure from col-
luding attacks by presenting betweenness ranking based and
correlation clustering based approaches for outlier detection.
Implementation and deployment of APPLAUS is easily done
in bluetooth enabled devices and doesn’t require a lot of
computation cost.
Spatial-Temporal provenance Assurance with Mutual
Proofs (STAMP) scheme [3] is a solution that gives security
and privacy assurance to mobile users proofs for their past
location visits. STAMP is based on mobile devices in vicinity
to mutually generate location proofs. Some of the key features
of STAMP have been to maintain the integrity and non-
transferability of the location proofs and location privacy of
the users.The implementation also shows that it requires very
low computational costs to execute this on the mobile devices.
Hasan et al.[11] analyzed the secure location provenance
problem and introduced methods for making location proofs
resistant against collusion. The proofs let the user prove the
location in different granularity to a number of auditors.
The paper shows two schemes using hash chains and bloom
filters. Some of the experimentation results from the proof
of concept shows that these schemes are realistic in today’s
mobile environments.
Another interesting paper [6] shows that they have designed
two privacy-preserving alibi schemes: one for corroborators
who have no personal privacy issues and another one for
corroborators who want to keep control over the disclosure
of their identities. The paper also demonstrates that schemes
are implementable and usable in today’s mobile devices.
The main contribution of our work in attestation compared
to the state of the art is around the Global consistency check.
Our work details how attestation can be achieved at a global
level by making use of trust models. EigenTrust and PeerTrust
models are used to show the results and benefits around
global attestation. Global trust models are a crucial part of the
consistency check in our solution. This technique proves that
user’s true location can be confirmed using global attestation
scheme much more accurately in comparison to the local
attestation schemes.
III. BACKGROUND
XACML (eXtensible Access Control Markup Language),
was formed by the OASIS (Organization for the Advancement
3of Structured Information Standards) standards consortium.
XACML is a simple, flexible way to express and enforce
access control policies in a variety of environments, using
a single language. The XACML language in effect protects
content from unauthorized use in enterprise data exchanges.
XACML is mainly derived around and written in, XML,
which is understood in most global environments. OASIS,
which drives the development, convergence, and adoption of
e-business standards, has ratified XACML. XACML gives
an extensive and powerful set of features to the developers.
It allows an organization to create and deploy authorization
policies to match its mix of assets and business use-cases, then
plug in additional policies as the business and its standards
evolve. XACML helps in resolving issues related to security
applications and there have been a number of papers published
in order to prove the same. Xuebing et al. [21] detailed in
their paper how XACML can be used to solve some of the
issues with mobile environment. Arunkumar and Rajarajan
introduced XACML in the mobile environment and hence
proposed a new architecture for data access control [5].
It is interesting to note that the implementation of GeoX-
ACML for access control requires 2 main pieces to function
correctly. The first piece is to ensure that the right user is
getting the right access to the right resource. In order to
achieve this, global attestation of location is a must. This
paper will detail the global attestation scheme and how the
user’s location information can be verified by other user’s in
the vicinity.
The second important piece for geospatial access control to
work is to ensure that the location information being passed
to the server is passed using geohash. Geohash is a lati-
tude/longitude geocode system invented by Gustavo Niemeyer
and has been made public. It is a hierarchical spatial data
structure which subdivides space into buckets of grid shape.
Using geohash, the geographical co-ordinates can be sent to
the server without having to send them as is.
IV. SYSTEM MODEL
There are increasing number of mobile applications being
used by end users to access all kinds of services. Location
based services are mainly used for accessing location related
capabilities. To ensure that the right user is receiving the
location based services, the requirement of location proofs
have been commonly seen and understood. So by making
use of the Access Points, the location proofs are provided
by the APs in the form of a proof to ensure that the mobile
device requesting a service is at a particular location at a
particular point in time. This has been very well implemented
and researched by various researchers including Saroiu et al.
[5], Zhu et al [22] and through VeriPlace in [4].
When the user and the AP are colluding, it clearly indicates
that the user is in the vicinity of the AP and hence it is
convenient for the AP to attest for the user’s location. Another
example for location attestation could be where a user is in
the vicinity of 3 APs nearby. Individually each of the APs can
attest the user’s location and the attestation could be verified.
However, what are the consequences when a global check is
done for capturing inconsistency. If all the 3 APs are put
together and if a consistency check is done, it could either
result in a positive feedback where all the points add up or it
could also result in a negative feedback where all the points
don’t add up. This proves that one of the locations provided by
the user is a false location. By doing a global check through
a mechanism named global attestation, it is possible to check
whether the user has been lieing all through the path.
This brings us to a strong point that even if local attestation
passes the check, does it mean that its correct. If it is correct,
when multiple local attestations are done, will all the points
add up? Our system model using global attestation scheme
proves that a global consistency check is very crucial to prove
the location proofs add up and that the user is not faking the
location information through the entire journey of the request.
Bitcoin has been using Block chain as the transaction database
shared by all the nodes in a system [18] . This has been used
as part of our system model for the global consistency check.
A global log of the contacts is maintained in the database
similar to block chain which is used to ensure that the locations
reported by the entities themselves and other contacts in the
proximity add up to result in a positive/negative feedback.
V. GLOBAL ATTESTATION SCHEME
In our model, each device (e.g., users and access points)
provides reports about their locations. These devices register
to our system with their Bluetooth or WiFi MAC addresses
and each is given a unique ID. A location report from an
entity x does not only contains its location, but also the MAC
addresses sensed in the proximity. Therefore, if two devices
are close in location, they may sense and report each others’
MAC addresses.
If all of the devices honestly report their locations and
others they sensed, we may easily confirm the locations of
these devices by cross checking the reports from different
devices. However, these devices may not be honest, and
even they may collude to mislead the system. Therefore, we
do not assume the reliability of devices and compute their
trustworthiness while reporting their and others’ locations.
There are various statistical trust models. On the other hand,
most of them requires some sort of ground truth to come
up with positive and negative evidence (or feedback) for the
behavior of entities. In these models, each report from an entity
is evaluated with respect to ground truth. The report serves
as a positive feedback for the trustworthiness of the entity if
it complies with the ground truth. Similarly, it serves as a
negative feedback if it does not comply with the ground truth.
While the computation of positive and negative feedback is
trivial when ground truth is available, in our setting, we do
not have ground truth for the location of devices.
We propose to use report consistency instead of ground
truth to derive positive and negative feedback for the compu-
tation of trust. Our system uses a global log of location reports
in the system. This global log can be implemented similar to
blockchain [8], which is a transaction database shared by all
nodes participating in Bitcoin protocol [18].
4Fig. 1: Trust Feedback Graph.
Let us consider two devices i and j that provide a number
of location reports over time. At time t, let us assume that they
share their reports Rti and R
t
j , which include the locations of
these devices as lti and l
t
j , respectively. If l
t
i and l
t
j are in
proximity, report of each device may confirm the existing of
other by including its MAC address. If lti and l
t
j are not in
proximity, report of each device may not include the MAC
address of other. In these cases, the reports are considered
consistent; otherwise, they are not.
We use consistent reports from pairs of devices as posi-
tive feedback for their trustworthiness. Similarly, inconsistent
reports serve as negative feedback. If devices i and j have
n positive and m negative feedback, their overall positive
feedback ratio is computed as ci,j = n/(n+m). Using positive
and negative feedback, we compose a feedback graph where
edges are weighted based on the computed overall positive
feedback ratios. Figure 1 demonstrates a sample feedback
graph.
Once a feedback graph is computed, we can use existing
graph-based trust models to calculate trustworthiness of the
nodes in the graph. While various trust models can be used,
in our system, we use two specific graph-based trust models:
EigenTrust [15], [9] and PeerTrust [20], [17]. These are models
that compute global trust values for the nodes of a graph based
on their local trust values, e.g., edge weights.
EigenTrust [15] provides an efficient and robust method
for computing global trust values. The calculation of the trust
values are similar to the ranking calculations of the well-
known page rank algorithm. It generates a matrix C whose
each each entry C(i, j) corresponds to
ci,j∑
k ci,k
.
Then, the principal eigenvector of the feedback matrix C gives
the global trust values for the nodes.
PeerTrust [20] computes a node’s trust value based on
the number of feedback and the credibility of feedback. The
credibility of feedback for pairs of nodes may be measured by
the personalized similarity of these nodes. In order to compute
the similarity between two nodes i and j, we first create their
feature vectors fi and fj , respectively. The kth element of fi
is set as ci,x – the weight of the edge between i and k in
the feedback graph. Then, cos(fi, fj) – the cosine distance
between fi and fj – is computed as
cos(fi, fj) =
fi · fj
||fi|| × ||fj ||
and taken as the personalized similarity of the nodes. Details
of the PeerTrust algorithm can be found in [20].
After calculating global trust scores for the entities, our
location attestation algorithm considers these trust scores as
follow. When an entity reports its location, we find a set of
positive reports (reports that concur with the location claimed
by the entity) and negative reports (reports that claim that
the entity was located elsewhere, or a lack of report from a
trusted entity close to the claimed location). Then, we select
the report from the most trusted entity (in this set) as the
consensus report. If the consensus report agrees with the
entity’s claimed location then it is accepted; otherwise it is
rejected. If the report from the most trusted entity conflicts
with the reports from other entities with similarly high trust
values, the consensus report could not be created. The lack of
consensus report is considered same as the lack of report from
a trusted entity close to the claimed location.
VI. IMPLEMENTING GEOSPATIAL XACML
The main contribution of this paper is to restrict access
to data from mobile devices based on geospatial attributes
of the requester. XACML policy is applied to check the
access rights before making a decision on an access request.
However, it does not have operators and construct to handle
geospatial attributes. There are several well-established open
source XACML libraries, such as SUN’s implementation1.
In an XACML policy, several attributes of a requester are
checked against their values to grant access. In this paper,
we propose to extend the existing XACML implementations
with the ability of handling geospatial attributes efficiently.
For this purpose, we introduced new functions and attributes
that support geospatial functionality.
We have two main attribute extensions: GeoPoint and
GeoPolygon. A GeoPoint attribute represents a particular point
which stores a latitude and a longitude. For instance, position
of an access requester is represented as a GeoPoint instance. A
GeoPolygon instance represent a region or geospatial bound-
aries, e.g., a building, or a room. This can be achieved by
storing multiple GeoPoints, which when combined create a
polygon. The polygon generation can be done with polygo-
nization provided by existing topology libraries such as JTS2.
In addition to these attribute extensions, we implemented a
function called geo-contains,which takes a GeoPoint and a
GeoPolygon as arguments and checks to see if the point is
contained by the polygon.
With these extensions, the requester may send the current
location together with the access request using XACML re-
quest to a Policy Decision Point (PDP). The PDP checks
geospatial policies to decide if requester may be allow the
requested access or not. Once the access is allowed, Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP) provides the requested resource. A
simple example policy and access request are listed in Figure 2
and Figure 3, respectively. In the example policy, it is stated
that doctors can access medical records within the geospatial
boundaries defined through a geoPolygon object. In the request
example, a doctor with name John requests medical records
1http://sunxacml.sourceforge.net/
2http://www.vividsolutions.com/JTS
5Fig. 2: A GeoSpatial policy example.
Fig. 3: A GeoSpatial request example.
for patient named Alice. The PDP may examine the request
and provide grand based on the policy.
In the policy example above, the geospatial boundaries are
unnamed. In other words, we explicitly define the geospatial
boundaries instead of addressing this region. This makes it
harder to author policies, since the policy author may not cor-
rectly enter the geopoints composing the polygon. Authoring
policies become an important issue as the number of policies.
To handle this, we propose to store geoPolygon objects in a
separate database and use alias to refer to them. For instance,
the geoPolygon object used in the example policy is stored in
a database table with alias CentralHospital. Then, the alias can
be used while defining the policy, instead of explicitly using
the geoPolygon object. Therefore, the policies could be more
human friendly and less error prone.
The geo-contains function is responsible for checking if
the location of the requester is within a region defined by
geoPolygon object. This may be a costly operation if we
represent the polygon as a set of geopoints. However, if we
use GeoHashing [7] to represent geoPolygon objects instead
of multiple geopoints, we can very efficiently perform the
containment test. Geohash is a geocode system invented by
Gustavo Niemeyer. For each geopoint, geohashing produces
a code. By gradually removing characters from the end of
the code will reduce the precision and the code would be
representing a region instead of a single point. Therefore,
geohash codes belonging to nearby points may have similar
Fig. 4: GeoSpatial Access control framework
prefixes. That is, the longer a shared prefix is, the closer the
two points are. In other words, we can efficiently check if
a point falls into a region by checking the prefixes. As a
result, we propose to store geohashing prefixes for geoPolygon
objects and exploit these while checking if requesters’ location
falls into predefined regions.
Figure 4 shows the components of our framework. Policies
and requests are composed based on GeoXACML standards
using the introduced techniques. In this framework, geospatial
attributes are handled in preprocessing step in which a GeoX-
ACML policy is converted into a regular XACML policy (with
equality/prefix/range constraints on geohash) and during policy
verification step the input geospatial attributes of requesters
are converted to their geohashes and the regular XACML
policy can be applied. The main advantage of this solution
is that we can use an existing XACML engine to implement a
geoXACML engine very easily and perform geospatial policy
reasoning efficiently.
VII. GEOSPATIAL ACCESS CONTROL IN HEALTHCARE
In this section, we will introduce a scenario from health-
care domain to motivate and demonstrate our framework for
geospatial access control in mobile devices. Medical records
contains important information for diagnosing and curing
various health problems. Authorised doctors with expertise
may access medical information about their patients while
fulfilling their responsibilities such as diagnosing, monitoring,
and curing patients. However, these doctors may not access
these records for a different purpose, since they may contain
sensitive data. There may be a relation between purpose of
access and the location of access requester. For instance, a
doctor may be in the hospital while diagnosing or examining
an outpatient. Therefore, she may request medical reports of
the patient from the hospital, e.g., her office. It is less likely
that the doctor will use the requested information for the right
purpose (i.e., diagnosis) if he/she is trying to access it outside
of the hospital. Doctors may access their patients’ records only
when they are in the right location. In order to restrict the
access based on attributes and location of the requester, we
may use policies written in GeoXACML.
An example policy and related request are listed in Figure 2
and Figure 3, respectively.
In order to demonstrate how our solution is deployed for
this and similar problems, we implemented a mobile iOS
6Fig. 5: Architecture of the demo application.
Fig. 6: Geopolygon showing a point inside the polygon
application. Architecture of this demo application is shown
in Figure 5. In the PDP, we store policies such as “Doctors
must be in the premises of their hospitals if they are required
to access particular patients records”. Then, we have extended
SUN’s XACML implementation as described in the previous
section to implement GeoXACML policy decision and en-
forcement points. In order to store patient records, we have
used a relational database at the back-end.
Figure 6 shows the polygon defined and a point within
the polygon which refers to the location of the doctor making
the request. Since the doctor’s location is within the polygon,
the doctor will be allowed to access the records. One of the
snapshot from our demo application is shown in Figure 7. The
figure shows the patient details that is visible to the doctor,
once he has passed the policy check.
Fig. 7: A screen shot from the mobile application.
VIII. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section we present an experimental evaluation of the
proposed global attestation scheme approach using three pub-
licly available datasets (see Figure 8). The San Francisco
taxicab dataset includes GPS location traces from about
500 taxicabs over a period of 30 days. These cabs covered
a spatial extent of about 600 km2 around the city of San
Francisco. Contacts between cabs were synthetically induced
when two cabs happened to be within 600 meters of each
other. When the spatial resolution of contacts was reduced
below 200 meters, contacts were very infrequent and that over
1200 meters induced a large number of contacts; hence the
choice of 600 meters for experimentation. The MIT Reality
Mining dataset includes WiFi location traces from about
75 entities (typically personal laptop and handheld devices)
over a period of 30 days. These entities covered a spatial
extent of about 10 km2. Contacts between two entities were
naturally induced when two entities connected to the same
WiFi access point. The Infocom06 dataset includes Bluetooth
contacts from about 78 entities (a subset of attendees of IEEE
Infocom 2006 conference) over a period of 4 days. These
entities covered a small indoor spatial extent of under 1 km2.
Contacts between two entities were naturally induced by pair-
wise Bluetooth contacts. We remark that these datasets were
intentionally chosen with varying degrees of contact density
(number of contacts per entity per unit time). The taxicab trace
from San Francisco has the least contact density, while the
indoor Bluetooth contact trace from Infocom06 has the largest
contact density.
In our experiments we emulate both honest and dishonest
entity behavior. A honest entity faithfully reports contacts with
other entities; e.g., in the taxicab data a honest taxicab would
report contacts with all the other taxicabs that are within
the chosen threshold distance of 600 meters. A dishonest
entity can report both false positives and false negatives: a
false positive report is one wherein a dishonest entity reports
contact, that which has not really occurred (e.g., a dishonest
taxicab a claims that it is in contact with taxicab b when b
is currently more than 600 meters from a); a false negative
report is one where a dishonest entity fails to report a true
contact (e.g., a dishonest taxicab a fails to report contact with
taxicab b when b is within the threshold 600 meters from a).
In our experiments we also emulate both collusive and
non-collusive settings for the dishonest entities. In a non-
collusive setting a dishonest entity randomly chooses to induce
a false positive or a false negative report. In a collusive
setting a dishonest entity is more strategic: a dishonest entity
would also concur with its colluder, i.e., if a dishonest taxicab
a reports a contact with its colluder b, then b would also
report a contact with a. Further, the choice of the location
in the contact report between two colluding entities could be
arbitrarily chosen (including a location that which neither a
and b are currently located). In this setting dishonest entity
would continue to randomly induce false positive and false
negative reports against non-colluders (i.e., honest entities).
When two entities a and b concur (e.g., a reports a contact
with b at location l at time t and b reports a contact with
7a at location l at time t) then the trust management system
would treat this as a positive feedback between a and b. When
two entities a and b fail to concur the trust management
system would treat this as a negative feedback. Indeed based
on one instance of non-concurrence it is impossible to say
whether a is dishonest or b is dishonest or both are dishonest
(both being dishonest is feasible only under the non-collusive
setting). We combine multiple positive and negative feedbacks
to determine a trust score (between 0 and 1) in an entity using
the EigenTrust and the PeerTrust algorithms.
Figures 9 and 10 show the error in trust score under non-
collusive and collusive settings (respectively). Given the trust
score estimate for an entity a ( ˆtsa) and the ground truth
trust score (tsa = 0 for dishonest entity and 1 for honest
entity), the error in trust estimate is computed as the root mean
square error in the estimate. We also compare the approaches
with random, that assumes uniform trust in all the entities.
We observe that in a non-collusive setting, then both the
EigenTrust and the PeerTrust approach is very effective in
estimating trust even when the fraction of dishonest entities is
large (and hence do not offer corroborating evidence). Also,
the localized approach to trust estimation helps PeerTrust
outperform the EigenTrust solution that attempts to compute
a global trust score for each entity. However, in a collusive
setting both the EigenTrust is generally effective when we the
fraction of dishonest entities is small than 0.5. The PeerTrust
approach (again due to its localized trust estimation strategy)
is relatively more robust. Nonetheless both the approaches are
ineffective (compared to the baseline random strategy) when
an overwhelmingly large fraction of entities are dishonest.
Figures 11 and 12 show the error in location attestation
under non-collusive and collusive settings (respectively). Loca-
tion attestation considers the trust scores of entities that report
the target entity’s location as described in the previous section.
That is, we select the report from the most trusted entity (in
this set) as the consensus report. If the consensus report agrees
with the entity’s claimed location then it is accepted; else
rejected. We also check for absence of reports from highly
trusted nodes that are in the vicinity (e.g., within 600 meters
of the location claimed by a taxicab in San Francisco dataset).
Location attestation error is captured as the root mean square
error in accepting / rejecting a location claim, with accepts
assigned a numerical value of one and rejects assigned a
numerical value of zero.
We observe that under a non-collusive setting both the
EigenTrust and the PeerTrust solution are effective even when
a large fraction of entities are dishonest. Since location esti-
mation relies on the entity with the highest trust score, under
a collusive setting we observe that when an overwhelming
fraction of entities are malicious, neither of the solutions are
more effective than the baseline random strategy. However,
for most practical settings wherein the fraction of dishonest
entities is under 0.5, the EigenTrust and the PeerTrust solution
offer a viable solution for robust location attestation.
A summary of key observations from our experiments are
as follows:
• In general, the trust estimation error and location attes-
San MIT Infocom06
Francisco Reality
Num Entities 512 75 78
Location Source GPS WiFi Bluetooth
Sampling Interval (secs) 30 300 120
Spatial Extent (km2) 600 10 1
Temporal Extent (days) 30 30 4
Num contacts 28,241 18,665 182,951
Fig. 8: Datasets
tation error are acceptably small (< 15%) when we have
fewer than one-third dishonest entities.
• In general as the contact density increases the error in
trust estimation and location attestation decreases. Recall
that the San Francisco dataset has the lowest contact
density, while the Infocom06 dataset has the highest
contact density.
• The PeerTrust approach of computing the trust score is
more robust when we have a large fraction of dishonest
nodes. The PeerTrust approach can handle more dishonest
nodes because it uses personalized trust scores for each
entity, rather than a global trust score (as in EigenTrust).
We have run 100000 tests and implemented 3 additional
test, which are the objects used in GeoXACML extension.
In the run with GeoXACML extensions we have created
3 Attribute objects and 1 FunctionBase object so we have
268 nanoseconds just object creation overhead. The rest is
execution time for checking if a point is located within bounds
of a polygon in which we have a database access. Figure 13
shows the results highlighted from the tests:
Some of the potential limitations of the global attestation
scheme could be if all the entities are dishonest users. In such
a scenario, the scheme will not work as per the requirement.
For the global attestation scheme to work, there is also a
requirement of trusted contact entities. If the trusted entities
turn to be malicious users, then other methods of ensuring that
the same entities are not used repetitively to get the consensus
report should be considered.
IX. SUMMARY
With increasing volumes of data tagged with space and
time (e.g., from smartphones) it is becoming increasingly
important to support contextual (e.g., location-based) access
control to data and resources. In this paper we have explored
solutions to realize the GeoXACML access control model
that allows a security administrator to specify location-based
access control policies. This paper presents the first imple-
mentation and architecture for GeoXACML. The key novelty
in our approach is the ability to use geohashes to translate
a GeoXACML policy into a conventional XACML policy
- this allows us to fully reuse existing implementations of
the XACML engine. The paper also describes a case study
in the context of healthcare services wherein access control
to handheld devices is moderated based on the location of
the device. As a part of our future work we will explore
solutions for location attestation (to authenticate the location
of a device) and scalable enforcement of GeoXACML policies
(as the volume of machine-to-machine traffic increases).
8Fig. 9: Trust Estimation Error in a Non-Collusive Setting: San Francisco, MIT Reality and Infocom06
Fig. 10: Trust Estimation Error in a Collusive Setting: San Francisco, MIT Reality and Infocom06
Fig. 11: Location Attestation Error in a Non-Collusive Setting: San Francisco, MIT Reality and Infocom06
Fig. 12: Location Attestation Error in a Collusive Setting: San Francisco, MIT Reality and Infocom06
Fig. 13: Results showing the overhead with and without
GeoXACML.
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